Case Study on Proposed Tallahassee Biomass Plant
John Fort
September 20, 2009
Introduction
In the fall of 2008 a large public controversy erupted around the potential construction of a
biomass gas and electricity plant in Tallahassee, Florida. The plant was proposed by the
Biomass Gas and Electric Corporation (BG&E), a company out of Norcross, Georgia.
Negotiations between BG&E and the City of Tallahassee began in early 2006 and resulted in a
Power Purchase Agreement in October of that year. However, widespread public awareness of
the plant did not begin until 2008, when BG&E sought the necessary DEP permits. Despite
several public meetings in the winter of 2008-09, the controversy around the project escalated
and finally, in February 2009, BG&E withdrew its plans to build the plant in Tallahassee.
This case study will examine the decision making process involved in the development
review of the proposed plant. This process will be discussed in light of events that unfolded
from the initial proposal of the project in January 2006 until BG&E’s withdrawal from the
project in February 2009. The BG&E plant had the potential to be an innovative source of green
electricity for the city of Tallahassee. The goal of this case study is to reach a better
understanding of the decision making process regarding the plant.
I will analyze the failure of the project using the Mutual-Gains Approach of Lawrence
Susskind and Patrick Field (1996). This approach outlines six key steps for handling contentious
public issues. I will comment on each of the six steps with regards to the application to this
particular process. The results of my analysis suggest that a more transparent and participatory
decision making approach would have increased the chances of project success.
History of the Project
The history of the project had seven distinct phases:
· Initial Inquiries
· Negotiations between the city and BG&E
· Agreement for the city to purchase power from BG&E
· Negotiations involving FSU
· Permitting Process
· Public Comment
· Public Involvement
I have arranged a timeline of events around each of the seven phases. A more in depth
description of the most relevant events is included in a Narrative History in the appendix.
Timeline
Initial Inquiries
January 2006- BG&E submits terms of potential agreement to city (Farris 2006a)
February- June 2006 Communications between Farris and the Tallahassee Utilities involving
siting and terms of Power Purchase (Thompson 2008, pp. 3-4)
June 9, 2006—FSU trustees meet to consider including the B&E plant at Innovation Park as part
of their Master Plan
June 21-22, 2006—Commissioner Katz and Glenn Farris (CEO of BG&E) make fact finding trip
to BCT Technologies Bioconversion Plant near Denver, CO (Farris, personal communication
April 28, 2009)
Negotiation Phase
June 28, 2006—Farris presents proposal to Tallahassee City Commission (Thompson 2008, p.
83)
July – October 2006- Negotiations between City of Tallahassee and BG&E regarding leasing of
the FSU Innovation Park Site and terms of Power Purchase Agreement (Thompson 2008)
Agreement to Buy Power
October 11, 2006—City Commission votes to approve 30-year Power Purchase Agreement with
BG&E. (Byrne and Thompson 2008, Thompson 2008)
Negotiations regarding FSU involvement
Jan 10, 2007- City Commission approves long term contract between City and FSU to pay FSU
incentives for reducing demand and for leasing land for BG&E plant. City adds language to
agreement requiring explicit standards for FSU performance. (Thompson 2008)
Jan 13, 2007—FSU withdraws offer to sublease Innovation Park site to BG&E (Pecquet 2007)
Jan 21, 2007- Mayor John Marks writes Democrat article stating position in favor of BG&E
project and hesitancy to commit to guarantee incentives to FSU without guarantees of benefit to
Tallahassee ratepayers (Marks 2007).
Jan 24, 2007—City Commission Agrees to pay incentives to FSU without requiring FSU to
demonstrate benefits to rate payers (Thompson 2008)
February 2, 2007—FSU signs contract with BG&E to lease Innovation Park site
Permitting Process
April 2, 2008: DEP received air construction permit application from BG&E for the Tallahassee
Renewable Energy Center (TREC) (DEP 2008a).
May 2, 2008: DEP sent request for additional information to BG&E (DEP 2008a)
July 28, 2008: DEP received response to request for additional information from BG&E. (DEP
2008a)
October 24, 2008: DEP Issues Technical Evaluation and Preliminary Determination (DEP
2008a)
Public Comment Period
November 4, 2008- DEP publishes public notice of proposed permit for BG&E plant
November 17, 2008: Petitions filed by 11 Tallahassee Citizens asking for review of DEP’s
permit to BG&E (DEP 2009)
November 20, 2008: DEP rejects Citizen Petitions due to lack of formal grounds for objection
(DEP 2009)
December 4, 2008: Amended petitions filed by 4 Citizens citing DEP’s acceptance of BG&E’s
proposed level of emissions and particulate from fuel-stock delivery (DEP 2009)
Public Involvement
August 7, 2008- Tallahassee Scientific Society hosts meeting at city hall to address concerns
about the plant (Ritchie 2008a)
November 13, 2008 --SAIL high school meeting (Cain 2009)
November 20, 2008—BG&E hires Ron Sachs Communications, a local PR Firm (Ritchie 2008b)
November 24, 2008- Proctor hosts biomass meeting (“Concerned residents attend…”
2008)
December 3, 2008- Tallahassee Chamber of Commerce hosts Press Conference regarding the
plant. (“Full Press Conference on the Biomass Plant” 2008)
December 8, 2009—Ron Sachs organizes forum at TCC (Taylor 2008)
January 5, 2009—Council of Neighborhood Associations (CONA) hosts public meeting
regarding the plant (CONA 2009)
January 14, 2009—CONA issues official statement indicating its support of biomass but
opposition to the sighting of the plant at Innovation Park. CONA references the inconsistency of
the siting with Land Use Goal 11 of the Tallahassee-Leon County Comprehensive Plan. CONA
found a lack of “good faith” in the public process surrounding the proposed plant (CONA 2009)
February 2, 2009- BG&E withdraws Air Permit Application from DEP (Farris 2009a)
The Mutual-Gains Approach
The BG&E plant had the potential to be an innovative source of green electricity for the
city of Tallahassee. There was the possibility for mutually beneficial partnerships with the
University. As CONA pointed out, the BG&E plant promised to bring several important benefits
to the city. However, the planning process involved was not sufficiently transparent or
participatory. What guidelines might future projects use in order to address these concerns?
In their 1996 book, “Dealing with an Angry Public: The Mutual-Gains Approach to
Resolving Disputes,” Susskind and Field outline a novel approach for dealing with public
disputes. If used properly, they promise that their approach will provide a systematic method for
government and business leaders to interact more successfully with the public. This will lead to
a decrease in public anger and less money wasted on resolving disputes in court (Susskind and
Field 1996). Could this approach provide some insight into the process that took place around
the BG&E plant?
Susskind and Field contrast their method to the traditional PR approach often taken by
business and government leaders. As Leon County Commissioner Akin Akinyemi said in an
interview, the traditional approach to projects is to create them out of the public eye and then
attempt to sell them to the public (personal communication April 28, 2009). This is along the
lines of the “Decide-Announce-Defend” approach. Instead, as Susskind and Field recommend, a
more participatory approach to project development may ultimately lead to better results for all
stakeholders.
The mutual-gains approach is based on a simple fundamental principle: “to think of the
interaction with the public as a multiparty, multi-issue negotiation (Susskind and Field 1996,
p.13).” Using this way of thinking, it becomes possible to apply the “principled negotiation”
theory developed by William Ury and Roger Fisher at the Harvard Project on Negotiations
(1991). A key tenet of this theory is that all parties involved stand to benefit from seeing the
negotiation as a venture in joint problem-solving. Rather than merely focusing on the size of
their particular “piece of the pie,” participants are encouraged to understand the interests of the
other parties and thus find means of increasing the size of the entire pie (Fisher and Ury 1991).
This way of thinking opens up the possibility for a win-win outcome, rather than the traditional
win-lose outcomes that occur in zero-sum bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1991).
Six Steps for Mutual Gains
Susskind and Field outline six steps for achieving Mutual Gains:
1. Acknowledge the concerns of the other side
2. Encourage joint fact finding through public and scientific learning
3. Offer contingent commitments to minimize impacts if they do occur, and promise to
compensate knowable but unintended impacts
4. Accept responsibility, admit mistakes, and share power
5. Act in a trustworthy fashion at all times
6. Focus on building long-term relationships
(Susskind and Field 1996, p13)
I will deal briefly with each of these six recommendations.
1. Acknowledge the concerns of the other side
A foundational element of Susskind and Field’s approach is an emphasis on face to face
conversation between the parties in disagreement. They point out that even if the public’s fear or
anger is not well founded, it still needs to be acknowledged and addressed (p. 25). In the
Tallahassee case, there were instances of the two sides communicating with one another, but not
enough emphasis was put on acknowledging the concerns of the other side.
A common impediment to this process is determining what constitutes a “valid concern”
of the other side. For example, anger which is portrayed as irrational, can often be discounted.
In the case of the biomass plant, proponents of the plant often depicted their opponents as angry
without rational cause. It is commonly assumed that if a person is irrationally angry, then their
position does not deserve consideration in public discourse. The mutual-gains approach
challenges this assumption. Susskind and Field advise us not to differentiate between rational
and irrational anger (20). Focusing on the rational/irrational distinction further divides the
parties involved and prevents understanding and communication from taking place.
Instead, Susskind and Field suggest that we come to understand all anger as a “defensive
response to pain or the threat of pain real or perceived” (16). The first step, then in moving past
this anger and on to the issues at hand is to gain an understanding of the pain or threat of pain.
In the case of the BG&E plant, opponents felt threatened that their neighborhood would
be changed without their consent. Furthermore, they felt pain at having been left out of the
decision making process. In responding to opponents, the proponents focused primarily on the
benefits of the plant. According to the mutual-gains approach, they should have spent more time
seeking out and acknowledging the sources of their opponent’s anger, whether or not it was
deemed to be “rational.”
2. Encourage joint fact finding through public and scientific learning
Once the two parties have recognized the emotional stake each has in the controversy, it
becomes possible for them to move forward to work on the issues as hand. However, jointproblem
solving requires a common set of facts which everyone trusts. As in most development
projects, information about the project was provided by the developer. However, Susskind and
Field point out a problem with this in that, “information gathered, analyzed, modeled, and
carefully packaged behind closed doors may have no credibility when it appears, even if it is
quite accurate” (39). By opening the doors and inviting in members of the concerned
communities, BG&E could have done a much better job of creating a set of mutually acceptable
facts.
In contrast to joint-fact finding, what happened in the Tallahassee Biomass situation was
independent fact finding which generated two separate sets of facts—those believed by
proponents and those believed by opponents. This led to a polarization of stakeholders—those in
favor of the biomass plant as proposed, and those against the plant as proposed. The lack of a
middle ground made it very hard for the two sides to find a mutually agreeable solution.
With regards to the proposed biomass plant, I believe that all parties could have benefited
from a greater effort from prescription 2, “Encourage joint fact finding.” As the authors explain,
this is a process of generating information which will be believable to both sides. The public
perception of the accuracy of the facts involved in a particular situation is just as important as the
truthfulness of those facts.
Joint fact finding is also one of the principles recommended by John Scholz and Bruce
Stiftel in the introduction of their edited volume on Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict. In
their analysis, two key components to successful adaptive governance are scientific and public
learning (Scholz and Stiftel 2005, pp 5-8). Although they discuss these issues in light of water
conflicts, their reflections can be extended to public land use issues such as the case at hand. As
this project relied heavily on cutting-edge science, it seems important to focus on the problems
with the Scientific Learning which took place.
Scientific Learning
Scholz and Stiftel point out the difficulties with incorporating science into our public
decision making processes (2005 p. 8). Science advances our understanding of the world by
interpreting the results of experiments. Often, science does not produce clear and simple
answers. This is frustrating for policy makers who are required to make concrete decisions
(Ozawa 2005).
In the case of the BG&E plant there was a great deal of cutting-edge science involved.
There was no dispute about the novelty of the technology. According to BG&E, “This was
going to be the most advanced biomass plant on the face of the Earth,” (Farris, personal
communication April 28, 2009). The question raised by this novelty was the degree of risk it
entailed. The public was scared about being treated as “Guinea Pigs.” Farris could explain to
them the safety that had been achieved in prototype plants, but his credibility was largely
undermined by the fact that the public did not feel that their concerns had been acknowledged.
Another problem was that different technical issues (air quality, economic, traffic and property
values) were brought up at different meeting with different audiences and experts.
3. Offer contingent commitments to minimize impacts if they do occur, and promise to
compensate knowable but unintended impacts
The proposed BG&E plant would have undoubtedly had some impact on the community
around the plant. These impacts were probably over exaggerated by the opponents of the plant,
but the information presented by the proponents of the plant did not carry much credibility
because it was not produced through joint fact finding.
On the other hand, if the two sides had agreed upon a set of likely impacts then they
could have worked together to find strategies for minimizing those impacts. One tool that
Susskind and Field suggest towards this end is the use of “contingent commitments” (39). For
example many homeowners were afraid that their property would lose value due to the noisy and
dirty nature of the plant. BG&E, on the other hand, predicted the plant to be clean and quiet.
One solution would have been for BG&E to suggest that landholders around the site have their
houses appraised before any construction begins. BG&E could then put money is escrow which
would be used to cover the difference between appraised value before the plant and sale value
after the plant.
4. Accept responsibility, admit mistakes, and share power
This prescription returns again to the importance of sitting down face to face with the
other side. In the case of the Tallahassee biomass plant there were several cases of passing the
blame. Neither the city, nor BG&E, nor FSU, wanted to be responsible for siting the plant at
Innovation Park. On separate occasions each party blamed the others for siting the plant there
and for the lack of transparency in the process.
When it came to sharing power, the communities around the site were left out of the
process. While this may have seemed strategic at first, this approach ended up being the undoing
of the entire project. The citizens who opposed the plant were able to find their own power and
use that to leverage public opinion about the plant. Thus, by not sharing power, the proponents
of the plant entered into a battle for power which they ultimately lost.
5. Act in a trustworthy fashion at all times
As Susskind and Field point out, trust is largely about expectations. If you want people
to believe that you will honor your commitments in the future they need evidence of your
honoring past commitment (40). In the case of the Tallahassee plant, the lack of transparency in
the process made people question the trustworthiness of what was taking place. It may have
been perfectly legal and even done with the best intentions, but the public got the impression that
they were being kept out of the loop. This was sufficient to spark a lack of trust.
The most effective way to create a trustworthy impression is to follow the preceding steps
in a genuine fashion. People are much more likely to trust one another when they feel that they
have been listened to and involved in the process. In this case, the lack of trust was a major
impediment to BG&E’s successful completion of their plant.
6. Focus on building long-term relationships
If the BG&E biomass plant had been built at the Innovation Park site, the company and
the people living around the plant would have been neighbors for a long time. The bulk of the
controversy concentrated on the plant’s siting and construction; however this would have only
been the first event in the neighbor-relationship between BG&E and the community. This
reflects an over-emphasis on the short-term perspective, something that Susskind and Field
observe all too often in the work that they do (41). They suggest that broadening the perspective
to see the “big picture” can bring benefits to all parties involved.
Framing the interaction in terms of the long-term relationships casts a whole new light on
the importance of the other five prescriptions. The degree to which one party trusts the other is
not only important for this one particular interaction, but actually influences their interactions
into the future. Indeed, this point seems to bring light to Susskind and Field’s admonition to
regard their six prescriptions as a “comprehensive strategy for dealing with an angry public”
(40). Because we are interested in affecting long term relationships, each one of the five steps
plays a role in this process.
Conclusions
The biomass plant controversy serves as an important example of the complex
interactions between government, business, and the public. The mutual-gains approach offers a
set of approaches to these difficulties. Perhaps if future endeavors such as this are treated as
multiparty, multi-issue negotiations with a focus on joint problem solving, outcomes for
government, business, and the public can be improved.
By following the six prescriptions of the mutual-gains approach, we can help translate
anger into productive interaction. In particular the mutual-gains approach helps us to step away
from short-term thinking and understand the larger context in which our interactions are taking
place. In the case of the BG&E plant, these six steps could have helped both proponents and
opponents to realize more of their respective interests.
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28, 2009.
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Affairs, Tallahassee Scientific Society. Retrieved from http://geomag.gfdi.fsu.edu/tsscopa/
bioelectric.html on April 28, 2009.
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Facility.” Retrieved from
http://www.econa.org/resources/pdfs/biomass%20facility%20position.pdf April 28, 2009
“Concerned residents attend meeting about biomass plant.” November 25, 2008. Tallahassee
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Commissioners regarding Chronology of Activities- BG&E.
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Gasification Combined Cycle.” DEP File No. 0730109-001-AC
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http://www.dep.state.fl.us/Air/permitting/construction/tallahassee.htm#Legal_Actions April 28,
2009.
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Roberts Avenue. pp. 8-10 in: Thompson, AF. 2008. Memorandum to Mayor and City
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1
Appendix
Narrative History
Initial Inquiries
In early 2006, BG&E approached the city of Tallahassee with a proposal to build a 30
MegaWatt (MW) electricity plant powered by the gasification of woody biomass. The city,
which derives most of its power from natural gas, was interested in the prospect of diversifying
its energy portfolio. The two entities entered into negotiations that took place through letters, emails,
phone calls, and face to face meetings (Ben Cowart, personal communication April 20,
2009).
Negotiations between the city and BG&E
During the negotiations between BG&E and the city, several important issues were
discussed. Multiple times, BG&E offered to build a 75 MW plant instead of the originally
proposed 30 MW plant. The city was not interested in buying power from a plant this big, but it
took several rounds of communications to get this point across (Ben Cowart, personal
communication April 20, 2009).
Potential sites for the plant were also discussed. In an August 2006 letter from its
attorney, BG&E describes four requirements for a potential site:
1. Adjacent to a railroad track to allow for delivery of fuel
2. Proximate to an existing electrical substation
3. At least 15 acres in size
4. Zoned for light industry
(Linnan 2006)
According to BG&E there were only two sites within the Tallahassee City Limits which met
these criteria: A site on the grounds of the Hopkins Electrical Power Station (owned by the city),
and a site at the Florida State University (FSU) Innovation Park. In this same 2006 letter, BG&E
writes that the Hopkins site presented permitting issues which made it undesirable. The city also
wanted to reserve that land for expanding their future generating capacity.
Having selected the Innovation Park Site, BG&E requested that the city go about leasing
this land from FSU and then subleasing it to them. This was another case in which it took
several rounds of communication for the city to convey the fact that they were not interested in
being involved in arrangements for the siting of the plant (Ben Cowart, personal communication
April 20, 2009). Eventually BG&E dealt with this situation by making arrangements with FSU.
Despite a few communication difficulties, the negotiations between BG&E and the city
were amicable and smooth. Representatives of both parties recognized that each side had
something the other wanted (Ben Cowart, personal communication April 20, 2009 & Glenn
Farris, personal communication April 24, 2009). The city had two main concerns:
1. To pay only for power generated
2. That the power be dispatchable, in other words that less electricity would be generated
under periods of lower demand.
BG&E’s main concern was to secure a Power Purchase Agreement from the city which
would allow them to seek funding and DEP permitting.
Agreement for the city to purchase power from BG&E
On October 11, 2006, the Tallahassee City Commission approved a Power Purchase
Agreement in which the city contracted to buy power from BG&E, at an escalating rate for the
next 30 years. This agreement satisfied both of the city’s main concerns.
1. To pay only for power generated.
The terms of the agreement put all “capacity charges” into the price of the electricity. In
other words, the city would pay back the cost of constructing the plant as it bought the electricity
generated by the plant.
2. That the power be dispatchable
The Power Purchase Agreement set provided arrangements for the city to buy Synthetic
Gas (Syngas) from the plant during offpeak hours. Using its gasification technology, the plant
would continuously produce Syngas, a medium BTU fuel gas. During the hours of peak electric
demand, the BG&E plant would burn the Syngas in a combined cycle gas turbine to generate
electricity. During the offpeak hours, BG&E would sell the gas directly to the city for use in its
natural gas pipelines.
With regard to the siting of the plant, the agreement refers to “the property of the State of
Florida made available for use by Florida State University contemplated by the Parties as the
location of the Facility (Byrne and Thompson 2006, p. 5).” The agreement itself does not give a
more explicit description of the location of the site. However, preceding communications make
it clear that the only site involving FSU is the one located at Innovation Park.
Negotiations involving FSU
During the course of negotiations with the city, BG&E also initiated negotiations with
FSU regarding the use of the site at Innovation Park. As early as June 9 of 2006, the FSU
trustees met to consider including the BG&E plant in their Master Plan. As previously
mentioned, BG&E and the City of Tallahassee took several rounds of negotiations in order to
come to the understanding that BG&E would have to lease the land directly from FSU (Ben
Cowart, personal communication April 20, 2009).
Permitting Process
BG&E submitted an application for a DEP air permit on April 2, 2008. The permit
outlined the technology that would be involved in the plant and the expected levels of emissions.
One month after receiving the application, DEP issued a request for additional information.
BG&E responded at the end of July and on October 24, 2008, DEP issued a Technical
Evaluation and Preliminary Determination regarding the BG&E Biomass Plant. This document
reviewed the science involved in the proposed plant’s production of gas and electricity. It also
set levels of emissions for the plant (DEP 2008a).
The publication of the Technical Evaluation brought new attention to the proposed plant.
The Democrat published a front-page article about the plant (Ritchie 2008c) which attracted a
great deal of public attention (Ritchie, personal communication, April 28, 2009).
Public Comment
On November 4, 2008 DEP published a public notice regarding their intent to issue a
permit for the BG&E plant. This notice led to the submission of 11 citizen petitions asking for a
review of the permit. All but one of these initial petitions were rejected by DEP on technical
grounds (DEP 2009). The petition submitted by County Commissioner Bill Proctor led to a DEP
request for an Administrative Law Judge Hearing (DEP 2009).
Public Involvement
Even before the publication of the DEP Technical Evaluation there were public meetings
taking place regarding the proposed plant. On August 7, 2008, the Tallahassee Scientific Society
hosted a meeting at City Hall. At the meeting, there was some mention of the opposition to the
plant, but for the most part the meeting was an opportunity for BG&E to explain their position on
topics including air pollution, fuel sources, and fuel delivery (Ritchie 2008a).
Following the publication of the DEP Technical evaluation there were several public
meetings which took place. Amidst a growing sentiment of public concern about the plant,
BG&E hired Ron Sachs, a local Public Relations Firm, to handle their publicity.
In December 2008, Ron Sachs was involved in two key events in the Public Learning
phase of the process: a December 3rd press conference and a December 8th forum at TCC. The
press conference was hosted by the Tallahassee Charmeber of Commerce and featured speakers
in favor of renewable energy and economic development (“Full Press Conference on the
Biomass Plant” 2008). The TCC forum brought together representatives from BG&E and the
CSX Transportation Authority to speak to the 70 attending citizens about the benefits of the plant
(Taylor 2008).
On January 5, 2009 the Tallahassee Council of Neighborhood Associations (CONA)
hosted a public meeting regarding the plant. The meeting was attended by the most vocal
opponents and proponents of the project. Nine days after the meeting, the Council issued their
official position on the plant. Although CONA strongly supported green energy initiatives, they
did not feel that public had been sufficiently involved in the planning process. Due to this lack
of “good faith” public outreach and an inconsistency with Land Use Goal 11 of the Tallahassee-
Leon County Comprehensive Plan, CONA took a stance in opposition to the project (CONA
2009)
On January 27, 2009 BG&E wrote a letter to the City of Tallahassee withdrawing plans
to build the plant. This was followed by a letter to DEP to withdraw the Air Permit Applications
(Farris 2009a).